JULIUS CAESAR AS ARTFUL REPORTER: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments

Edited by Kathryn Welch and Anton Powell

Contributors: Jonathan Barlow, Adrian Goldsworthy, Lindsay G. H. Hall, Barbara Levick, Anton Powell, Louis Rawlings, Catherine Torigian, Kathryn Welch, T.P. Wiseman

Duckworth with The Classical Press of Wales
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INTRODUCTION

Caesar and Roman Politics in the 50s BC

In his densely argued review of C. Meier's biography of Caesar (Gnomon 62, 1990, 22-39), Ernst Badian challenges Meier's portrayal of Caesar as the greatest of the 'Outsiders' of Roman politics in the Late Republic (pp. 23, 27-8). Meier from the beginning of his biography states (1996, p. 10), 'Caesar, by contrast (with his opponents) saw [Roman politics] from without. This is why he was able to gauge the power relationships so accurately, though without knowing how firmly rooted the cause of the Senate still was in the public mind.' And later, 'Caesar and his opponents thus represented two disparate realities: the old reality, which had once been the whole and was suddenly reduced to a part, and the new, which had detached itself from the old and could hardly have been realigned with it even if war had been avoided...’ Badian counters this view, pointing to choices, alternative pathways and possibilities for very different conclusions (especially pp. 28, 37, 38).

This book is a different challenge to Meier's view of a Caesar with limited choices and a pre-determined future. In the first paper, Wiseman firmly rejects Meier's view that the Commentaries De Bello Gallico were produced as a unity at the end of the decade. He goes further to argue that Roman society of the period had ways and means of extending the message of such works to the less literate or illiterate in Rome and Italy. This view of a staggered production of the works is held, with individual differences of opinion and with a greater or lesser commitment, by most of the authors of this volume. All of them, however, see Caesar as embroiled in the language, politics and difficulties of his day, experimenting with solutions as opportunity offered, presenting himself in contemporary terms to his fellow Romans as the greatest and most worthy of them, striving beyond all else to outdo his most significant rival, Pompey the Great.

A Caesar supremely conscious of Roman politics and of his need to be central to Roman thinking even when he was in faraway Gaul or barbarous Britain is a theme taken up by all the authors of this volume. To regard the works as 'instant feedback' (to borrow an earlier title
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offered by T.P. Wiseman) must affect one’s view of the nature of the commentaries and the craft involved in composing them. In this view, the underlying concern of Caesar’s texts, so very different from those of the Continuators, is the struggle to dominate the imagination of Romans of all classes. Caesar’s popularity throughout Italy at the end of the decade attests the success which his portrayal of himself achieved. It was not, we suggest, won overnight or without extremely careful writing.

‘Instant feedback’ denied to Caesar opportunities of outright lying and, to a large extent, suppression of major disasters. Thus all authors, though in different ways (and with occasional disagreements), examine the possibilities open to Caesar to report on different incidents or about distinct groups given these conditions. The concentration in this volume is on how Caesar reports and to whom, and the effect of that reportage on other aspects and topics.

Thus Wiseman’s paper begins the series of studies by evoking the ways in which Caesar’s works might be made public in Rome itself and the Italian towns, and the possibilities for Caesar of achieving respect and fame through this process of publicity. Hall and Goldsworthy explore two facets of Caesar’s successful challenge to Pompey, Hall in establishing Caesar’s consistent ‘Latinitas’ in the face of Pompey’s predilection for the company of Greeks and Greek authors, and Goldsworthy by evaluating Caesar’s portrayal of his generalship as a piece of conscious image-making. Levick and Welch point to the need in Caesar to answer the challenge set by Cicero’s speech of 66 BC, De Imperio Cn. Pompei, as to what constitutes the summus imperator, and the effect this has on the one hand on the nature of Book 3 and on the other on the portrayal of Caesar’s social equals. Even Caesar’s portrayal of his enemies offers him the opportunity to speak with authority to his own world. Barlow and Rawlings, in studies of the characterisation of Gallic chieftains and Gallic methods of warfare, demonstrate Caesar’s conscious presentation of the Gauls in specifically Roman terms and for a specifically Roman audience. Torigian and Powell argue the very great care employed by Caesar in preparing the commentaries for particular audiences, Torigian through a study of rhetorical devices and Powell in examining Caesar’s presentation of embarrassing moments which required explanation.

The spotlight in this volume falls on the Gallic War Commentaries. This was not because the Civil War Commentaries do not contain some artfulness but because in the later more obviously polemical work, the craft is more apparent. The seven books written by Caesar de Bello
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Cicero’s speech of 66 BC,
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Caesar’s presentation of

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Gallico, however, were written when the issues were not inevitable,
when choices were being made by both Caesar and his contemporar-
es, when Caesar was engaged on a campaign which could make or
break him in a Rome which already had strong (but not immutable)
opinions about him. The concerns of 58, moreover, were not necessar-
ily those of 52. The conditions of Roman politics changed through that
dramatic decade. Such a climate as Rome in the 50s BC called for particu-
lar reporting, careful oratory, exceptional artfulness. After armies had
become irrevocably involved in a civil clash, the winning of public
opinion to the merits of either side, while still all-important, inevitably
took a different form. The Commentaries on the Civil Wars or those of
the Continuators, including Hirtius’ eighth book on the Gallic Wars,
have been used in most cases for contrast, to show the choices Caesar
did not make but might have in his account of campaigns in Gaul.

Disagreements between the nine authors on points have been left
for the reader to examine. This book is about possibilities suggested by
the text and context rather than magisterial comments about the
nature of Caesar or Caesar’s writings. Many of the papers are part of
larger projects which either take the individual contributors further
into studies of Caesar or far away from him. Thus it is hoped that this
book is both a contribution in itself to the study of Caesar’s writings,
much neglected in recent years in English-speaking scholarship, and
a means by which others will be encouraged to return to Caesar the
focus such a figure deserves.

Examining the craft of Caesar’s self-presentation, especially given
the conditions in which he chose to work, has led the present writer, at
least, to a deepened respect for him as a publicist and politician.
However, Caesar for most of the authors of this book is not the Caesar
of Mommsen or of Meier. He is a politician reacting to his own world,
an image-maker grappling with the need to win over contemporary
public opinion, a ‘post-Zanker’, if you will, rather than a ‘post-
Mommsen’ Caesar who cannot be appreciated without an understand-
ing of contemporary and sometimes transient concerns. This volume
works within and reacts to the great tradition of Caesarian scholarship,
but it belongs to its age as much as Caesar’s writings did, and this is an
age where the general is no longer a hero and the rhetorician is always
suspect, though both types continue to fascinate.

It remains to take the opportunity to acknowledge the generous
help of many to me as co-editor of this book. To Anton Powell of the
University of Wales Institute of Classics and Stephen Mitchell of the
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contribute to and edit the volume and for continued assistance. Thanks are due also to my colleagues at the University of Sydney for their encouragement and advice and to my fellow contributors who cheerfully suffered through the constraints placed on an editor committed to an Antipodean timetable and a heavy teaching load.

Kathryn Welch
University of Sydney 1998
This chapter is prompted ('provoked' might be a better word) by a couple of sentences in Christian Meier's magisterial biography of Caesar:¹

Caesar may have contributed to his own success by the way in which he composed his reports to the Senate. Of these we get some impression from his book *De Bello Gallico*, for although it was not written until 51, when the situation had become much more difficult, we may presume that its account of his problems and achievements does not differ radically from that contained in his earlier reports.

That is essentially the view put forward by Matthias Gelzer in the previous standard work on Caesar, first published in 1921. Referring to Caesar's request in 51 BC for an extension of his proconsular command, Gelzer wrote:

> If only the senators were free to decide for themselves, he would be sure of a majority! In order to provide them with the necessary evidence to do so, he published the seven books *De Bello Gallico* simultaneously with his proposal.

> This work consisted of an impressive and comprehensive edition of the campaign reports which Caesar had previously sent to the Senate, and ended with the senatorial decree celebrating the glorious suppression of the last great revolt with a thanksgiving of twenty days' duration.

As Meier puts it, 'he never thought to convince his opponents. He addressed himself to those senators and knights who were still undecided, relatively open-minded and impressionable.'²

Two assumptions are being taken for granted here. First, that *De Bello Gallico* is a single narrative, composed as a unit after the defeat of Vercingetorix; second, that it was aimed at an elite audience of senators and *equites*, and based on earlier reports to the Senate. As Michel Rambaud firmly announced in 1966:³

> A Bibracte, entre la mi-octobre et le 29 décembre 52 (b.g. VIII.2.1), César
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dicte les sept livres du Bellum Gallicum... Il s'adresse au milieu politico-littéraire, composé des sénateurs, des chevaliers et de leur fils.

Both assumptions, it seems to me, are demonstrably false.

It has often been noted that at BG 2.28.1, after his wonderful account of the great battle at the Sambre in 57 BC, Caesar remarks that the Nervii were effectively wiped out: ‘hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto...’ How could he have written that in 51 BC, little more than two years after fighting his way through a huge force of Nervii to rescue Quintus Cicero’s winter camp? And when he tells his readers in Book 5 that the Nervii and their allies besieging Cicero numbered sixty thousand, how can he expect them to forget that in Book 2 the Nervii had had only five hundred fighting men left?1

The obvious inference is that when Caesar wrote and published Book 2, he didn’t know what was going to happen in the winter of 54–53. The prima facie assumption ought to be that the books of the commentaries were written and published year by year, and the onus of proof ought to be on those who believe otherwise.

How could such excellent historians as Gelzer and Meier fail to recognise that elementary methodological point? Perhaps they just took it for granted that a text presenting itself as a unity must have been composed as a unity. But this text is not a unity anyway: Book 8 was added by Aulus Hirtius soon after the Ides of March, to create a continuous narrative of all the Gallic and Civil War commentaries.3 There is no a priori reason to suppose that Books 1–7 were already a unit before Hirtius collected and edited the ‘complete Caesar’.

Another natural assumption is that a text is designed for readers. The extent of ancient literacy is a notoriously controversial question,4 but it is reasonable to assume that only a small educated elite was in the habit of buying books. So of course Caesar must have been writing for senators and equestres; who else mattered? Here too, however, there is internal evidence that points another way.

One of the most interesting episodes in Book 1 is the panic in Caesar’s army at Vesontio, at the prospect of facing Ariovistus and the Germans. The narrative clearly identifies the source of the panic as the young equestrian officers on Caesar’s staff. The soldiers of the tenth legion, on the other hand, are twice praised for their dependable courage, and the report of a soldier’s joke marks them out as worthy of equestrian rank – more so, the narrative implies, than the real equestres.5 Soon after that, in Ariovistus’ boastful speech, we learn that members
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of the Roman elite have been in touch with the German leader, promising him their friendship and support if he kills Caesar. The antithesis of plebeian bravery versus upper-class cowardice and treachery could hardly be more explicit.

The phrase populus Romanus occurs no fewer than forty-one times in Book 1. Caesar presents himself as upholding the honour of the Roman People, protecting its empire, avenging its defeats, helping its allies — and he repeats the talismanic phrase with no less emphasis than Cicero had used in the speech from the Rostra for Pompey's command. One might reasonably infer that Caesar too was addressing the People.

Caesar was, consistently, a popularis. In 67, as an ex-quaestor, he was the only senator to vote for the tribune Gabinius' bill giving Pompey the piracy command; in 65, as aedile, he re-erected in the Forum the trophies of Marius that Sulla had had dismantled; in 62, as praetor, he was suspended from office by the Senate's emergency decree, and only reinstated after mass demonstrations by the populace; in 60, as a candidate for the consulship, he caused such anxiety among the senatorial establishment that even Cato contributed to the bribery fund to keep him out, and the consular provinces were announced as 'forests and drove-roads' to prevent him getting a military command.

Everyone knew that his consulship would be a trial of strength between rival ideologies. Facing up to the prospect in December 60, Cicero fortified himself with the aristocratic values of epic poetry, resolving to fight for Rome as Hector had fought for Troy. But his was a Rome of the few, not the many; Caesar stood for the multitudo, the Roman People whom Cicero had described a few months earlier as 'the scum of Romulus...our freedmen, even our slaves'.

The first thing Caesar did as consul was to have the proceedings of the Senate and popular assemblies publicly recorded. Then as now, open government and freedom of information were ideological issues. He tried conspicuously to achieve senatorial co-operation for his legislative programme, and when it was refused, with predictably intransigent obstruction, he simply by-passed the Senate and took his proposals directly to the People. And it was the People, through the tribune Publius Vatinius, who gave Caesar his consular province, a five-year special command like those of Pompey in 67 and 66, consisting of both Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul. 'Groan as much as you like,' he taunted his opponents in the Senate; 'now I've got what I wanted, I'll trample all over you.' Ten years later, they preferred civil war to the prospect of Caesar as consul again.
This ruthlessly polarised political ideology is what lies behind the Gallic War commentaries. Of course Caesar’s enemies were in touch with Ariovistus. They wanted him dead.

For Caesar, the political problem was his absence from Rome. He had Lucius Balbus and Gaius Oppius running a very efficient publicity office, and every winter (until the disaster of 54–53) he was in Cisalpine Gaul within easy reach of Rome. But as long as he was not there in person, his enemies had the advantage. It was essential to keep his achievements constantly in the public eye. It was also constitutionally proper that the People’s general, carrying out the People’s mandate, should regularly report what he had done in the People’s name.

In these circumstances, is it really conceivable that the Gallic War commentaries were not published till 51? Or that they were rehashed reports to the Senate? What Caesar reported to the Senate is hardly likely to have been detailed narrative; more likely just a curt summary of achievement. It seems to me overwhelmingly more likely that each winter Caesar wrote up the events of the year’s campaigns with the Roman People as his intended audience, and had the text sent as fast as possible to Balbus and Oppius in Rome for copying and distribution. It was to Balbus that Aulus Hirtius dedicated his Book 8, with the comment ‘we know how quickly and easily he wrote’.

But what happened then? How did Caesar reach the Roman People? What exactly do we mean by the ‘publication’ of the commentaries?

Here we have to bear in mind a remarkable fact. In late-republican Rome historical narrative was popular entertainment. Our evidence for this is a passing comment in the De finibus, all the more compelling for its lack of emphasis: Cicero is alluding to something everyone knows. The pursuit of knowledge, he says, is desirable in itself, which is why we enjoy the details of history.

Quid quod homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia?

What of the pleasure that people of humble station with no expectation of a public career, or even artisans, take in history?

Artisans didn’t buy books. For them, history was not something read from papyrus.

From the beginning, history had been written to be read aloud. Thucydides refers to the akroaseis of the logographers, who were more concerned with entertainment than with accuracy; Duris of Samos insisted that dramatic representation, not mere writing, was what
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history required; historians performing in theatres were a familiar
phenomenon of Hellenistic culture right up to the time of Lucian.23
Publication was the public performance; the written text was for ‘con-
sultation by the educated’.24
Hellenistic practice applied also at Rome. Cicero’s passing com-
ment is borne out by the elder Pliny’s mock-modest preface:25

Tum possem dicere ‘Quid ista legis, imperator? humili vulgo scripta sunt,
agricolarum opificum turbae, denique studiosorum otiosis.‘

Then I might say ‘Why read that, your majesty? It was written for the
common people, the crowd of farmers and artisans, and after that for
such learned men as have leisure.’

If a popular audience could enjoy Pliny’s Natural History, the narrative
swiftness of Caesar’s commentaries would surely have held it spellbound.
What I think Balbus and Oppius did was more or less what the
younger Pliny reports Aquillius Regulus as doing with the biography
of his dead son:26

Ipse vero nuper adhibito ingenti auditorio librum de vita eius recitavit,
de vita pueri: recitavit tamen; eundem in exemplaria mille transcriptum
per totam Italian provinciasque dimisit. scriptit publice, ut a decurionibus
eligeretur vocalissimus aliquis ex ipsis qui legeret cum populo: factum est.

He even collected a vast audience the other day to hear him read a memoir
of his son—the life of a mere boy, but nevertheless he read it, and has had
a thousand copies made to distribute throughout Italy and the provinces.
He has written an open letter to the town councils asking them to choose
one of their number with the best voice to give a public reading of the
work; and this has been done.

For ‘the life of a mere boy’, that was extravagant. For the res gestae of
Gaius Caesar, however, it might be just what the Roman People ex-
pected. They were eager to hear, and he was eager to tell them.27 He
had the motive, the resources, and in a sense even the responsibility.

If that is roughly how it happened, then the winter of 54–53 BC is the
moment when the system broke down. The fifth commentarius was
surely meant to be the story of the conquest of Britain. But that
campaign was cut short,28 and the reason it had to be cut short is also
why Caesar was too preoccupied to write up the res gestae of 54. Instead
of a glorious narrative of victory, what came to Rome was news of the
deaths of two legates and about seven thousand officers and men. One
of the winter camps had been overrun, and Caesar had to fight very
hard to prevent the same thing happening to the others.
When was the narrative of that disaster composed? Since Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul the following winter,²⁹ what we have as Books 5 and 6 were presumably composed together at that time. After a year’s unscheduled gap, Caesar must have wanted to restore his audience’s interest and confidence. The story of Cotta and Sabinus is superbly dramatic, with individual acts of heroism to offset the disaster,³⁰ and although the expected vengeance on Ambiorix and the Eburones is not forthcoming, the audience is diverted with a detailed account of the customs of the Gauls and Germans, and lectured on the unpredictability of Fortune in the story of Quintus Cicero’s hair’s-breadth rescue from the Sugambri.³¹

After the Vercingetorix campaign in 52, Caesar wintered at Bibracte,³² where he probably wrote Book 7. It is almost as long as the combined length of 5 and 6, and no less brilliantly dramatic. Here too we find something Caesar had denied himself in the early commentaries, the composition of set-piece speeches which he himself could not have heard.³³

I think we should distinguish two stages in the creation of the Gallic War commentaries, the first (Books 1–4) from 58–57 to 55–54, the second (Books 5–7) from 53–52 to 52–51. In the latter, with the political stakes rising remorselessly, Caesar’s style rises too, from commentarius proper (providing the material for a ‘real’ historian)³⁴ to something which comes close to the status of full-scale historiography. But whatever the stylistic conventions, the means and the motive were the same.

The scene we have to imagine is one that no source happens to describe for us. We don’t even know where it took place. Perhaps in the Forum, by the Rostra or the temple of Castor,³⁵ perhaps in the Circus Flaminius,³⁶ perhaps in one of the temporary theatres set up for the ludi scaenici,³⁷ after 55 bc perhaps in the theatre of Pompey itself.³⁸ Wherever it happened in Rome, it was surely reproduced on a smaller scale in the main piazza of every municipium and colonia in Italy – a skilled speaker, a rapt audience, and the cool, clear prose of a master of narrative. (It was Caesar who said ‘avoid the unusual word as a sailor avoids the rock’.³⁹)

What our sources do allow us to see (just) are the recitationes of formal history: Timagenes, at the house of Pollio; Livy, with a small but discriminating audience; an unnamed historian, probably Tacitus, listened to by the admiring Pliny.⁴⁰ All these were performing in person for their social and intellectual peers, in the ordered world of the early Principate. What I think we must infer for Caesar’s commentaries is something quite different.
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The status of the author, the issues at stake for the audience and the political immediacy of the situation combine to make this a unique case. The publication of De Bello Gallico was much more than just a literary event.

Notes
1 Christian Meier, Caesar (Eng. trans. David Mcintosh, London 1995) 253; original edition Berlin 1982. See now John Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge 1997) 197: 'It seems likely that...the original dispatches that Caesar sent from Gaul to the Senate were in the first person, and that Caesar used some of these dispatches, reworking them into his book and changing first to third person.'
3 Michel Rambaud, L'art de la déformation historique dans les commentaires de César (Paris 1966) 365; ibid. 9-12, 403-5 for the date-of-composition question, assuming from the start that 'les sept livres du Bellum Gallicum constituent le récit d'une action continue fortement liée... ils présentent une forte unité de ton et de manière' (403 ff.).
4 BG 2.28.2, 5.49.1. Dismissed with astonishing insouciance by Rambaud, op. cit. 10: 'on peut dire que César s'est contredit, mais assigner à chaque livre une date différente reste une hypothèse'. Of course: the question is, which hypothesis better explains the phenomena?
5 BG 8 pref. 2. The generous treatment of Antony (8.50.1-3, cf. 48.9 in contrast with Labienus at 23.3-6) no doubt reflects the political context.
6 W.V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Harvard 1989), esp. ch. 7; Mary Beard et al., Literacy in the Roman World (JRA Suppl. 3, Ann Arbor 1991).
7 BG 1.39.2, 40.14-15, 42.5-6.
8 BG 1.44.12: 'multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum...'
9 BG 1.8.3, 10.2, 11.3, 12.6, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, 14.1, 14.7, 18.9, 19.2, 30.2, 31.7, 31.14, 31.16, 33.2, 34.4, 35.2 (twice), 35.4 (twice), 36.1, 36.2 (twice), 36.5, 40.1, 40.3, 42.5, 43.8, 43.9, 44.5 (twice), 44.7 (twice), 44.9, 44.12, 45.1 (twice), 45.2, 45.3. Noted by Marincola, op. cit. (n. 1) 212.
10 Cic. De Lege Manilis 6 (twice), 7, 11, 21, 23, 32 (twice), 33, 35, 41, 44, 45, 46, 53 (twice), 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63 (twice), 64, 69 (three times).
11 Cic. Cat. 4. 9 (63 bc), Att. 16.16a.3 (44 bc).
13 Pace Erich Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley 1974) 584 n. 104: 'there was no fundamental ideological cleavage between optimates and populares.' For a more balanced assessment (though still emphasising the common ground), see P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford 1988) 32-5, 56-65.
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14 Cic. Att. 2.3.3–4, quoting his own De consulatu 3 (fr. 11 Courtney) and Homer II. 12.243; not resisting Caesar would mean 'pax cum multitudine'. Cf. Att. 2.1.8 (June 60).
15 Suet. Jul. 20.1.
16 Dio 38.1–4, Appian BC 2.10.
18 Best attested in 54 BC: Cic. Att. 4.66.8; QF 2.11.4, 3.1.8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18; Fam. 7.5.2, 6.1, 7.1–2, 9.1, 16.3, 18.3. Also in 49: Att. 8.15a, 9.7a–c.
19 See Rambaud, op. cit. (n. 3) 12–17 on the pamphlet and propaganda war in the 50s BC, though he fails to draw what seems to me the inevitable conclusion about the publication of the commentaries.
20 BG 2.55.4, 4.38.5, 7.90.8 (thanksgivings voted by the Senate ex litteris); according to Appian (BC 2.91), 'veni vidi vici' was Caesar's report to Rome in 47 BC; see Rambaud, op. cit. 19–23 on official reports in general.
21 BG 8 pref. 6. Cf. Cambridge Ancient History 92 (1994) 386, 391, 401, 405–6, 414, where the hypothesis argued here is incorporated into the political narrative of the 50s BC.
23 Thuc. 1.211.1; Duris FGrH 76 F 1; Fouilles de Delphes 3.3.124 (FGrH 835 F 1, second century BC); Lucian De hist. conscr. 14–32 passim.
24 Explicit at Lucian Apol. 3, referring to his satirical piece 'On Salaried Posts'.
26 Pliny Epist. 4.7.2 (Betty Radice's translation, slightly adjusted).
27 'Tantis rebus gestis': Caesar ap. Pollio fr. 2P (Suet. Jul. 30.4, cf. Plut. Caes. 46.1), Caes. BG 1.13.1. Does this explain why Caesar used a third-person narrative? Cf. Marincola, op. cit. (n. 1) 196–8 (first person normal in commentarii) and 206 ('ancient audiences listened differently when a man recorded his own achievements and when another did it for him'). If the commentaries were written to be delivered by a speaker at a public meeting, narrating Caesar's exploits to the People, the third-person form was unavoidable.
28 BG 5.22.4, 'pooriter repentinae Galliae motus'.
29 BG 6.44.3, 'ut instituerat'.
30 BG 5.35.6–7 (T. Balventius, Q. Lucianus), 37.4–5 (Cotta himself, L. Petrosidius).
31 BG 6.11–28 ('non alienum esse videtur', 11.1); 35–42 (Fortuna 35.2, 42.1), with ariseta of P. Sextius Baculus (38).
32 BG 7.90.8.
33 BG 7.20 (Vercingetorix), 38 (Litavius). 77 (Critognatus); cf. 5.30 (Sabinus), 44.3 (Pullo), 6.35 (anonymous Eburo).
34 BG 8 pref. 5. Cf. Brut. 262. See Marincola, op. cit. (n. 1) 180–2 on the development of the commentarii form.
35 Contiones at Castor temple: Plut. Cato min. 27–8, Dio 38.6.2; Cic. Sest. 34
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on the tribunal Aurelium nearby (‘quasi pro theatro’, Cic. Ch.uent. 93), on which see F. Coarelli, Il foro romano: periodo repubblicano e augusteo (Rome 1985) 190–9.

37 cf. Dio 37. 58.4; J.A. Hanson, Roman Theater-Temples (Princeton 1959) ch. 1.
38 For the date, see Cic. Pis. 65, Asconius 1C.
39 Caesar ap. Gell. NA 1.10.4, Macr. Sat. 1.5.2, etc: ‘tamquam scopusum sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum.’
40 Seneca De ira 3.23.4, Suda s.v. Kornoutos, Pliny Epist. 9.27 (cf. also 1.13.3, 7.17.3). [Editors’ note: further on the question of who read the Commentaries see Levick, this volume p. 72.]